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Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements 
in a Labour Market Experiment
 *
 
We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated 
to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an 
auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (i.e. there is no 
statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favour the members of her 
own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by 
auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group 
when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias 
and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the 
game, with cumulative effects that generate strongly unequal outcomes. Because the initial 
bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in competitive market, providing a 
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Discrimination  is  a  despicable  phenomenon  that  affects  in  different  forms  various 
aspects  of  social  life.  It  may  concern  gender,  race,  social  class,  geographic  origins, 
ethnicity, age, and several other social categories. For this reason, discrimination has 
been  studied  by  different  disciplines  using  different  methods,  and  different  theories 
have been proposed to explain its emergence and persistence through time. A prominent 
explanation, popular among psychologists and biologists, is that discrimination reflects 
a  natural  tendency  of  human  beings  to  favour  the  members  of  one’s  group.  This 
tendency – and the related propensity to penalise the members of other groups – may 
have  been  adaptive  in  our  ancestral  past,  when  small  groups  competed  for  limited 
resources, but is maladaptive in the context of large and diverse societies such as those 
we presently live in. 
Explanations based on innate psychological propensities may be translated in the 
language of economics by introducing an exogenous “preference for discrimination” 
that influences our decisions in some economically relevant circumstance. One example 
that  has  attracted  the  attention  of  economists  is  the  labour  market,  where  minority 
workers may be assigned more menial jobs and/or lower wages even though they have 
the same skills and productivity as other workers. Traditionally, however, economists 
have found preference-based explanations unsatisfactory, because discriminatory tastes 
impose  costs  on  employers  that  in  the  long  run  should  be  eliminated  by  market 
competition.  For  this  reason  economists  have  explored  alternative  models  where 
discrimination  emerges  from  the  interaction  of  agents  who  do  not  have  strong 
discriminatory tastes, but form discriminatory beliefs about workers. 
To  achieve  this  result,  some  theoretical  models  have  introduced  uncertainty 
about the quality of individual workers, while others have focused on cost asymmetries 
that affect investment in human capital. Some of these models have been tested in the 
laboratory,  where  the  worker-employer  interaction  takes  the  form  of  a  tournament 
awarding a known prize to the highest bidder in an all-pay auction. A common feature 
of  these  experiments  is  that  discrimination  is  induced  exogenously,  that  is,  by 
manipulating  the  quality  of  bidders  or  introducing  noise  in  the  information  that 
auctioneers use to discriminate high- from low-quality bidders. However, as we shall   3 
see, the experiments have provided mixed results and only limited support to the models 
they were meant to test. 
In  this  paper  we  follow  a  different  route.  We  describe  the  emergence  of 
discrimination  in  an  experimental  setting  with  symmetric  bidders  and  perfect 
information about the quality of their bids. Following an established tradition in social 
psychology, we induce discriminatory behaviour imposing an arbitrary group identity 
on  bidders  and  auctioneers.  The  mechanism  that  sustains  discrimination  in  this 
environment  is  bidders’  expectations,  which  are  constantly  updated  following 
auctioneers’  decisions  to  award  the  prize  in  a  series  of  independent  tournaments. 
Expectations are mainly driven by a bias in auctioneers’ decisions which is costless, and 
thus cannot be exploited by competitors in a market. This mechanism is intriguing and 
corrects  some  flaws  of  existing  models  and  experiments  on  the  emergence  of 
discrimination.  It  also  bridges  the  gap  between  the  literature  on  discrimination  in 
economics, and research on social categorization and group identity in psychology. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we review the existing literature 
and lay out the problem to be investigated. Section 3 describes the experimental set up 
and provides a thorough analysis of the data. Section 4 concludes summarizing the main 
results and articulating their significance for the study of discrimination. 
 
2. Social groups and discrimination 
 
Categorization  is  a  pervasive  aspect  of  human  social  behaviour,  which  facilitates 
information transmission and economizes on our limited cognitive abilities. However, it 
is  generally  acknowledged  that  categorization  may  also  foster  discrimination,  if  our 
perceptions of the true characteristics of an individual are distorted by stereotypes about 
the  group  she  belongs  to  (Campbell  1967,  Tajfel  1982,  McGarty  et  al.  2002).  This 
phenomenon is amply documented in the case of minorities such as African-Americans 
in the United States or Southerners in Italy, who have been and still are burdened with 
negative stereotypes like idleness, shirking, dishonesty, or lying. Another case in point 
is  gender  discrimination,  which  prevents  talented  women  from  gaining  positions  of 
leadership in politics, business, and even the academia because of alleged differences in 
cognitive skills, physical strength, or competitiveness. 
The  possible  causes  of  discrimination  are  multifarious,  but  for  theoretical 
purposes it may be useful to divide them in two broad categories. On the one hand,   4 
discrimination  may  reflect  an  underlying  preference  to  treat  more  favourably  the 
members of one’s own group than the members of a group which is perceived to differ 
along some dimension. On the other hand, discrimination may be a consequence of 
people’s beliefs which associate (rightly or wrongly) a certain set of characteristics with 
membership in a certain group. These two mechanisms (preference-based and belief-
based discrimination) are not mutually exclusive, of course, and may play different roles 
in different contexts. In this paper we use them to organize our survey of the literature 
in separate sub-sections. 
 
2.1. Preference-based explanations of discrimination 
The  simplest  explanation  of  discrimination  is  that  people  like  it.  Since  the  1960s 
psychologists have gathered abundant evidence that human beings of all cultures and 
faiths have a strong tendency to treat preferentially the members of their own group 
compared to the members of other groups. In a famous field experiment with middle-
class teenagers, Muzafer Sherif showed that the mere creation of group identities in the 
context of a peaceful summer camp increased significantly the level of competition and 
aggressiveness (to the point that the experiment had to be suspended – see Sherif et al. 
1961). Henri Tajfel and his collaborators (e.g. Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel 1982) pursued a 
similar line of research using the so-called “minimal group paradigm”, an experimental 
setting  where  subjects’  behaviour  is  manipulated  creating  artificial  groups  based  on 
arbitrary criteria and meaningless labels. Again, it turns out that individuals become 
more cooperative, altruistic and caring towards the members of their own group than the 
members of other groups. From an economic point of view, it is noteworthy that group 
members are willing to pay a cost to increase inter-group differences in earnings or 
achievements  (they  are  inefficiently  spiteful  towards  out-group  members,  in  other 
words). 
In-group favouritism is not entirely mysterious from an evolutionary point of 
view (Richerson and Boyd 2001). In the ancestral past cooperation must have provided 
homo sapiens with a comparative advantage in fitness terms. The costs of altruism and 
cooperation  were  probably  recouped  in  the  course  of  repeated  encounters  with  the 
members of one’s own family or tribe, while competition for territory and resources 
made suspicion and hostility advantageous in the context of inter-group behaviour (e.g. 
Choi  and  Bowles  2007).  The  same  logic  however  implies  that  the  suppression  of 
discrimination within the group should be advantageous, for a larger cooperative group   5 
should  be  more  efficient  and  hence  out-compete  smaller  groups.  In  larger,  diverse 
societies like ours then there may be considerable efficiency losses caused by our innate 
tendency  to  favour  individuals  that  we  perceive  as  more  similar  in  terms  of  race, 
ethnicity, etc. 
This  “paradox  of  discrimination”  (discrimination  exists  even  though  it  is 
inefficient) emerges in a similar guise in economic theories that posit an exogenous 
preference  for  discrimination.  In  a  seminal  series  of  papers  Gary  Becker  (1957) 
proposed an explanation of discrimination in the labour market that is driven entirely by 
the preferences of employers, customers or co-workers. While the generality of this 
model makes it applicable to a number of real-world cases (sex, religion, race, etc.) it 
also raises the puzzle of the persistence of discrimination in a competitive environment. 
If discrimination is costly, it should be wiped away by market competition in the long 
run, in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary. So partly out of dissatisfaction with 
preference-based models, economists started to devise in the 1970s models that can 
explain the existence of discrimination equilibria in competitive markets. These models 
typically posit an invisible-hand mechanism that generates discrimination independently 
of peoples’ tastes for discrimination, and are briefly reviewed in the next section.
1 
 
2.2. Belief-based explanations of discrimination 
If not by their preferences, discriminatory behaviour may be generated by employers’ 
beliefs in the inferior quality of workers belonging to a certain group. For discrimination 
to  persist  over  time,  however,  it  is  necessary  that  such  beliefs  reflect  a  genuine 
difference between workers’ productivity – or, to put it differently, that employers do 
not have the opportunity to learn the true quality of discriminated workers. Since the 
1950s social scientists have been aware that in unhappy circumstances discriminatory 
beliefs  may  become  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  (Merton  1957),  if  workers  have  an 
incentive to conform to employers’ expectations. This outcome is not only unfair but 
also  socially  inefficient,  of  course,  because  lower  levels  of  effort  or  investment  in 
human capital by a sizeable minority cause losses of productivity at the aggregate level. 
Arrow (1973) modelled discrimination as a self-fulfilling prophecy in a seminal 
paper  devoted  to  discrimination  in  the  labour  market.  Arrow’s  model  assumed 
                                                 
1 For more comprehensive surveys, see also Rodgers (ed. 2006), and in particular the chapter on 
experiments by Anderson et al. (2006).    6 
incomplete information regarding the quality of workers, who must decide how much to 
invest  in  training  before  they  enter  the  job  market,  and  condition  their  investment 
decision  on  employers’  earlier  behaviour.  Arrow  assumed  that  employers  enter  the 
market  with  asymmetric  prior  beliefs  concerning  the  distribution  of  human  capital 
across two classes (A and B) of workers. Given the same signal, therefore, an employer 
will prefer to hire more skilled A-workers rather than inferior  B-workers. This will 
provide an incentive for B-workers to invest less in training, which will be taken by 
employers as further confirmation of their inferior quality. And so forth: the prior belief 
has become self-fulfilling. 
Arrow started the branch of so-called theories of “statistical discrimination” (for 
a thorough survey see Fang and Moro 2010). In such theories, typically, ex-ante equal 
groups achieve unequal outcomes ex-post. Although it is not individually costly in the 
sense of taste-based models, statistical discrimination has been challenged for relying 
on the assumption that employers cannot discover workers’ true skills by means of trial 
work periods (see Aigner and Cain 1977, Cain 1986). In a tournament for example the 
period before the promotion decision can be considered a trial period in which workers’ 
characteristics can be observed rather than inferred. However, as shown by Filippin 
(2009), minority workers who expect to be discriminated against face a lower expected 
return on their effort and may behave differently even in the trial work period. As a 
result, even though in equilibrium there may be profit opportunities for firms that are 
willing to pay B-workers more, no firm would be able to see them. 
This explanatory advantage of Arrow’s model however comes at a price. An 
obvious question concerns the origins of the prior beliefs that trigger the self-fulfilling 
prophecy. In an early experiment, Davis (1987) conjectured that biased prior beliefs 
may result from a simple statistical-cognitive distortion: the sample of candidates from 
the minority group, being smaller, is likely to contain fewer top-quality candidates. If 
employers remember top quality candidates more vividly, they will form the impression 
that on average the quality of minority workers is lower. Another possibility is that the 
priors reflect previous experience. Fryer, Goeree and Holt (2005) describe a classroom 
experiment where employers observe a noisy investment signal and discover the real 
quality of workers only after they have made their hiring decision. For a few rounds, 
employers sample from two groups of workers (Green and Purple) with asymmetric 
quality. When the asymmetry is removed, employers’ hiring decisions are still based on 
the (wrong) expectations that Green workers are better than Purple ones.   7 
As it turns out, however, neither mechanism seems powerful enough to generate 
robust discrimination. In Davis’ (1987) experiment, the sampling bias generates only 
mild discrimination, unless it is implemented with a particularly heavy hand. Similarly, 
in Fryer et al. (2005) the self-fulfilling prophecy is quite fragile: when the asymmetry is 
removed, the Purple (previously disadvantaged) players see new opportunities and raise 
their  bids  substantially,  causing  a  surge  in  their  hiring  rate.  Employers  thus  learn 
quickly about the new (symmetric) distribution of quality, and discrimination disappears. 
A similar phenomenon has been observed by Filippin (2008) in an experiment 
with human bidders (workers) facing an artificial auctioneer (employer). The auctioneer 
is programmed to hold discriminatory preferences against one group of bidders during 
the early rounds (“crazy” auctioneer condition), and to become a “fair auctioneer” at a 
later  stage  of  the  game.  Contrary  to  the  Fryer  et  al.  (2005)  setting,  in  Filippin’s 
experiment the bidders are not informed of the change that occurs in the parameters of 
the game – which intuitively should make the persistence of statistical discrimination 
more likely. Nevertheless, in most sessions minority bidders learn about the new (more 
favourable)  environment  by  occasionally  submitting  high  bids  that  turn  out  to  be 
successful. So discrimination seems to be less resilient in this laboratory environment 
than one would expect from statistical discrimination theory. 
Another anomalous finding that may interfere with statistical discrimination is 
the propensity of disadvantaged players to overbid in asymmetric tournaments, reported 
by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987). This behaviour may be motivated by a desire to 
compensate  what  subjects  perceive  as  an  “unfair”  disadvantage.  However,  it  may 
prevent  statistical  discrimination  from  occurring,  by  effectively  “levelling  up”  the 
exogenous inequalities introduced by experimenters.
2  
So far, to conclude, there has been only limited experimental research on the 
emergence of discrimination in tournaments. The existing evidence is mixed, and does 
not  indicate  strongly  one  mechanism  that  is  responsible  for  the  emergence  and 
persistence of discrimination. Belief-based mechanisms such as Arrow-style statistical 
discrimination are empirically fragile, while preference-based explanations should be 
                                                 
2 It is also possible to level the field by policy intervention, for example introducing affirmative action or 
equal opportunity programmes. The effects of such policies in experimental tournaments have been 
studied by Schotter and Weigelt (1992).   8 
vulnerable to competition in markets. Jointly, these considerations suggest that there 
may be alternative ways to explain the emergence and resilience of discrimination.  
In the rest of the paper we describe an experiment that points in an interesting 
new direction. The experiment lies at the crossroad between the literature on group 
behaviour and the literature on tournaments. As in classic group identity experiments, 
subjects are divided in two arbitrary groups. Experimental subjects then participate in a 
series  of  tournaments  with  feedback  at  every  round.  The  tournaments  are  perfectly 
symmetric – that is, we do not impose different investment costs on bidders. Whatever 
discrimination will emerge then is certainly due to the well-documented effect of group 
identity  on  players’  preferences.  Bidders  observe  auctioneers’  decisions,  and  update 
their  discrimination  beliefs.  We  should  then  expect  some  equilibrium  between 
auctioneers’ preferences and bidders’ expectations to emerge with repetition, and the 
nature  of  such  equilibrium  may  provide  valuable  insights  in  the  mechanics  of 
discrimination. In the next section we describe this setting in more detail, describe the 
results, and outline an explanation based on a Bayesian model of learning. 
 
3. The experiment 
 
In a tournament the payoff of every agent depends on her relative performance, i.e. how 
well she has done compared to other participants. A common way to determine payoffs 
in a tournament, for example, is to rank participants based on performance and to assign 
prizes in a descending order (the highest prize to the best performing agent, the second-
highest prize to the second agent, and so on). Tournaments can be used to model a 
number of familiar situations in real life, such as political elections, promotions within a 
firm, or competition for a new job. In the latter case, the prize is the job’s salary and 
applicants  compete  submitting  their  CVs  and  performing  during  interviews.  Their 
chances of being hired, however, typically depend on previous investments in education, 
training, etc. Because these investments are expensive, the costs may be represented as 
bids that are deducted from the prize. In other words, the total payoff is given by the 
prize minus the cost of the bid. It is generally assumed that a higher bid buys a higher 
chance to win the prize, because the employer prefers to hire more qualified applicants 
with higher human capital. The employer then acts as an auctioneer who observes the 
bids (investments) of the various applicants, chooses a bid that maximizes her utility, 
and assigns the prize to the respective bidder. The other applicants, who do not receive   9 
the prize, suffer a cost that is equal to the investment they have made: the tournament 
takes  the  form  of  all-pay  auction  in  which  all  bidders  pay  their  bids  regardless  of 
whether they have won the prize or not. 
 
3.1. Experimental setting 
We implemented this setting experimentally letting each subject play a series of ten 
tournaments with identical parameters, in groups of five players (four bidders and an 
auctioneer). To eliminate the potentially confounding effect of reputation, we used a 
“stranger” design where every subject was randomly allocated in a new group at every 
round. The role of each subject (bidder or auctioneer) was randomly determined at the 
start and remained the same throughout the experiment. 
At each round, each bidder received an endowment of 60 cents of a euro that she 
could invest to win a prize of 400 cents awarded by the auctioneer to a single bidder. 
Bidders were perfectly symmetric – we did not impose different investment costs – and 
their payoffs in each round were equal to their endowment minus their bid plus the prize 
(if they won). The endowment could not be accumulated over a series of rounds: after 
each round, whatever fraction of the endowment had not been spent was automatically 
paid  and  a  new  endowment  of  60  cents  was  provided  for  the  next  round.  The 
auctioneer’s payoff in contrast amounted to the winning bid she had chosen, multiplied 
by a factor of three (to increase the difference between bids, in case it was small). 
The monetary payoffs were designed in such a way as to eliminate any rational 
incentive to underbid. Suppose in fact that the auctioneer is unbiased (i.e. she chooses 
one of the highest bids that have been submitted and is indifferent between equal bids). 
If every bidder invests 60 cents (their whole endowment), the expected monetary value 
of her bid is 
EV(bid60) = (0 × .75) + (400 × .25) = 100.     
Since the expected monetary value of keeping her endowment is 60 cents, a rational 
risk-neutral  player  should  always  bid  her  whole  endowment,  assuming  that  all  the 
opponents are doing the same. An unbiased auctioneer has no incentive to deviate from 
a random decision and this strategy profile is therefore part of an equilibrium. Assuming 
a profit-maximizing (i.e. unbiased) auctioneer who randomizes to break the ties, such an 
equilibrium is also unique, since bidders are always strictly better off if they bid 60 
(either they outbid the opponents, or they match their proposal).    10 
This reasoning depends crucially on the assumption of auctioneer neutrality: the 
probability of winning the prize clearly declines if the auctioneer discriminates against 
some  bidders.  To  introduce  this  possibility  we  added  a  preliminary  phase  to  the 
experiment in which an arbitrary “group identity” was primed using standard techniques 
borrowed from the experimental literature in social psychology. 
Social  psychologists  have  identified  several  factors  that  contribute  to  the 
creation  of  “group  identity”,  including  physical  proximity,  face-to-face  contact, 
perceptual similarity, interdependence, and common fate (Hogg and Abrams 2003). As 
they entered the laboratory – and before they participated in the tournament – twenty 
subjects were randomly assigned to two groups (named “Red” or “Blue”) and asked to 
wear  a  bracelet  of  the  corresponding  colour.  Each  group  then  performed  a  simple 
cooperative task aimed at reinforcing their group identity: the goal was to memorize at 
least ten verses of a short poem in no more than five minutes, with another five minutes 
to  write  them  down.  The  two  groups  performed  the  task  in  separate  areas  of  the 
laboratory, under the supervision of an experimental assistant who did not interfere with 
their work but simply watched the time and monitored the results. 
The task was designed to suggest a natural division of labour among the group 
members  (each  member  could  memorize  one  verse),  and  to  almost  guarantee  the 
success of every group. Successful completion was rewarded with a prize of 30 euro, to 
be  equally  divided  among  the  ten  members  of  the  group.
3  These  two  factors 
(interdependence and common fate) magnify the bias induced by coloured bracelets, 
physical proximity, and face-to-face contact. 
At  the  end  of  this  preliminary  phase  all  players  were  asked  to  sit  at  their 
randomly  assigned  computer  terminals,  divided  by  partitions.  An  assistant  read  the 
instructions aloud, while the subjects followed on paper. Questions from the audience 
were elicited, until all misunderstandings had been resolved. At this point the second 
phase  of  the  experiment  (the  tournaments)  began.  The  first  screenshot  provided 
information concerning the role of each subject in the experiment: sixteen participants 
played as bidders (eight Blue, eight Red), and four played as auctioneers (two Blue, two 
Red). 
                                                 
3 All fourteen groups who participated in the experiment successfully completed the task, which they 
seemed to enjoy.   11 
Two Blue and two Red bidders participated in each tournament together with a 
Red or Blue auctioneer, with reshuffling at every round. The colour of each bidder was 
either  the  same  or  different  from  the  auctioneer’s  colour.  Following  an  established 
terminology in the experimental literature, we call in-group members those bidders who 
shared the same colour with the auctioneer, and out-group members those who did not. 
The in-group/out-group allocation remained fixed throughout the experiment. In other 
words: even though the auctioneer could change at every round, her colour remained the 
same. Each bidder was either always in-group, or always out-group. Auctioneers faced 
two in-group bidders and two out-group bidders in every round. 
At all stages of the experiment the identity of players was kept secret, while their 
group affiliation was common knowledge. The division in Red/Blue groups was meant 
to elicit group identity and, possibly, group favouritism in the tournaments. Of course 
there was no a priori guarantee that group priming would have a significant effect on 
subjects’ behaviour, but as we shall see the data strongly confirm this hypothesis. Our 
design then differs from all previous experiments where discrimination was induced 
imposing  different  investment  costs  on  bidders.  In  contrast  we  manipulated  directly 
auctioneers’ attitude towards discrimination, and saw whether this manipulation had an 
effect on their behaviour and the behaviour of bidders. To make this setting particularly 
inhospitable to discrimination we also eliminated all sources of uncertainty, such as 
noisy  signals  or  asymmetric  knowledge  of  payoffs.  In  our  experiment  all  monetary 
payoffs were common knowledge, and there could not be statistical discrimination – i.e. 
the  investments  (bids)  were  perfectly  observed  by  auctioneers.  Complete  feedback 
about submitted bids, as well as the choice of the auctioneer, was provided after every 
round. So the only source of incomplete information was the possible discriminatory 
bias of the auctioneers, about which bidders had to form (and update) beliefs.  
Notice that expectations of discrimination change the expected value of bids, 
and may deter competition in the tournaments. Suppose for example that a fraction d of 
auctioneers discriminates against out-group players. The expected value of bidding the 
full endowment, given that one is an out-group bidder, then becomes 
EV(bid60|out) = d × 0 + (1 – d) [(0 × .75) + (400 × .25)] = 100 – 100 d. 
Given that EV(bid0) = 60, a risk-neutral out-group player should bid nothing if she 
believes that d > 0.4. Assuming that the auctioneer actually discriminates against out-
groups, such a behaviour is also part of an equilibrium. Notice that auctioneers can 
discriminate against out-group bidders without forfeiting any profits, because they can   12 
do it at no cost. The reason is that in-group bidders have an incentive to compete among 
themselves anyway, even if they think that out-group players have no chance of being 
awarded the prize. In equilibrium in-group players should always bid 60, because lower 
bids would grant the same-colour opponent a profitable opportunity to win by bidding 
the maximum amount (assuming that the auctioneer cares about monetary payoffs). 
Consider, moreover, that bids in the interval [1-59] can never be rationalized for 
either type of player. Assuming that bidders are (and they believe that their opponents 
are) sufficiently sophisticated iterative reasoners, and that the auctioneer cares about 
monetary  payoffs,  the  optimal  bid  is  either  zero  or  60.  Even  relaxing  the  strong 
assumption that players play the equilibrium strategies via introspection, they should 
learn that bids in the interval [1-59] cannot be an equilibrium by means of trial and error 
(evolutionary) learning. Therefore, we expect bids in the interval [1-59] to disappear 
with the repetition of the game. 
To  sum  up,  our  experimental  setting  is  characterized  by  multiple  equilibria  that 
depend  on  out-group  bidders’  and  auctioneers’  behaviour.  In  principle,  we  could 
observe: 
1.  symmetric bids and unbiased auctioneers; 
2.  asymmetric bids and discriminatory auctioneers. 
In these two cases out-group beliefs would be correct both at the beginning of the game, 
and in equilibrium. However, there may also be self-confirming equilibria driven by 
false prior beliefs, such as 
3.  asymmetric bids driven by wrong prior expectations of discrimination (because 
the auctioneers are unbiased).  
Case 3 may trigger an  Arrow-style self-fulfilling mechanism, where incorrect priors 
lead to underinvestment, and this in turn generates unequal outcomes. Case 2 is similar, 
except  that  bidders’  prior  beliefs  are  not  wrong  but  reflect  a  genuine  bias  on 
auctioneers’ part. Case 1 is in a sense the least interesting for it would mean that we 
have failed to implement discrimination in the laboratory. 
Which  one  of  these  equilibria  is  instantiated  may  depend  of  course  on  the 
dynamic of the game. Because beliefs may evolve during the experimental game, we 
shall focus both on bidders’ “naïve” strategies at the beginning of the game, and on their 
behaviour at the end of the experiment, after they have received feedback concerning 
the decisions of auctioneers. To summarize, we shall ask the following questions: 
   13 
QUESTION  1:  Do  out-group  players  bid  more/less  than  in-group  players  at  the 
beginning of the game? 
QUESTION  2:  Does  the  behaviour  of  in-group  or  out-group  players  change 
significantly during the experiment?  
QUESTION 3: Do out-group players bid more/less than in-group players at the end of 
the game (in equilibrium)? 
 
Another  set  of  questions  concerns  the  factors  that  determine  behaviour  in 
equilibrium. In particular: 
 
QUESTION 4: Are auctioneers biased in favour of in-group members, and are they 
willing to pay a cost to discriminate against out-group bidders? 
QUESTION  5:  Is  the  behaviour  of  bidders  influenced  significantly  by  auctioneers’ 
decisions, or do prior beliefs largely determine the dynamics of the game?  
 
We try to answer these questions in the next section, where we describe the 
experimental data and provide a statistical analysis of the main findings. 
 
3.2. Experimental results 
We report the data of seven sessions with 140 subjects in total which we ran at the 
University of Parma, Italy, over two days in April and May 2011. Group allocation was 
designed  in  such  a  way  as  to  obtain  two  independent  observations  per  session,  or 
fourteen overall. Most subjects were in their low twenties, and studied business and 
economics.  Average  earnings  were  approximately  16  euro,  for  about  one  hour  of 
experimentation. Auctioneers earned on average more than bidders (20 vs. 15 euro) but 
the greatest achievers in absolute terms were a small subset successful bidders, who 
took home as much as 28 euro. The experiment was designed according to the usual 
conventions of experimental economics. 
We  begin  our  analysis  with  a  general  survey  of  auctioneers’  and  bidders’ 
behaviour. Figure 1 includes the average bidding patterns of in-group and out-group 
bidders for each session of the experiment (1b-h) as well as aggregate data from all 
sessions (1a). It is immediately apparent that in most sessions in-group players tended 
to bid more than out-group players (session 7 was the exception). It is also apparent that 
this difference emerged early, but not immediately in the experiment: in the first round   14 
there was a prevalence of out-group bids. Once established, however, the in-group out-
group  difference  was  fairly  robust  throughout  the  game:  in  equilibrium,  in-group 
players bade more. 
 
[Figure 1a-h about here] 
 
We test these propositions using data from all sessions. At the beginning of the 
game in-group players bade on average 33.1 cents in the first round, compared with 
41.0 cents offered by out-group players. Since there has been no strategic interaction 
among  players  before  the  first  bid,  we  regard  all  the  112  bids  as  independent 
observations. The difference is statistically significant (P > |z| = .046). 
 
RESULT 1: Out-group players bid more than in-group players in the first round of the 
game. 
 
This  asymmetry  however  was  reversed  already  in  the  second  round,  and  the 
opposite trend persisted until the end of the experiment. The average bid throughout the 
ten periods was 43.1 cents for in-group players and 34.2 cents for out-group players, a 
statistically significant difference at P > |z| = .005. 
 
RESULT 2: In-group players bid more than out-group players throughout the game. 
 
These two results are interesting because they suggest that the group identity 
manipulation administered in the first phase of the experiment did not discourage out-
group bidders at the start. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to rule out the existence of 
expectations of discrimination in round one. Out-group players’ rather bullish bidding 
in fact may be interpreted as an attempt to compensate a perceived disadvantage – a 
phenomenon  observed  by  Bull,  Schotter  and  Weigelt  (1987)  in  a  different  context. 
Behaviour  in  the  first  round  however  should  be  taken  with  a  pinch  of  salt,  for  it 
certainly  reflects  a  certain  amount  of  confusion  and  mistaken  beliefs.  One  sign  of 
confusion are intermediate bids (bids between zero and sixty cents), which should not 
be  observed  if  players  are  sufficiently  sophisticated  iterative  reasoners.  Table  1 
summarizes the percentage of maximum (60), minimum (0) and intermediate bids (0 > 
bid > 60) submitted by in-group and out-group players across the ten rounds of the   15 
experiment. We observe in both groups a decline of intermediate bids, from 60-70% in 
period 1 to about 20% in period 10, which suggests that a process of learning has taken 
place during the course of the experiment. (It is noteworthy that the sharpest reduction 
in intermediate bids occurred after the first period, and that learning was probably over 
by period six.) 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In  light  of  these  data,  and  following  a  useful  convention  in  experimental 
economics, we consider behaviour at the end of the game as most indicative of players’ 
preferences and beliefs in equilibrium. We take data from the last two rounds. Here the 
average bids amount to 42.4 for in-group players and 33.3 for out-group players,  a 
difference that is statistically significant at P > |z| = .08. 
 
RESULT 3: In-group players bid more than out-group players at the end of the game 
(in equilibrium). 
 
Table 1 shows that at the end of the game 64% of in-group players bade the 
maximum  amount  (60  cents),  compared  with  only  46%  of  out-group  players.  This 
difference  however  was  already  manifest  in  period  three,  and  persisted  with  minor 
variations thereafter. So it is not surprising that in-group players were on average more 
successful than out-group players. At the end of the experiment, in-group bidders took 
home on average 17.5  euro, compared with 12.7 euro earned by out-group bidders. 
Figure 2 summarizes the proportion of winning bids by in- and out-group players during 
the  course  of  the  experiment,  aggregating  across  all  sessions.  Notice  that  in-group 
players  won  the  majority  of  tournaments  in  every  round  except  one  (round  nine). 
Overall, they won the prize 64.3% of the time. What has to be explained is whether the 
behaviour of auctioneers was overall rational, in the sense that they tended to maximize 
their profits by choosing the highest bids, or was instead driven by discriminatory tastes. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In order to test this proposition we have to look more carefully at auctioneers’ 
decisions. Table 2 reports the decisions made by auctioneers, given the distribution of   16 
high bids in the tournaments.
4 There are eight logically possible cases, depending on the 
number of high bids (one, two, three, or four), and their type (in- or out-group). In the 
first two columns (“Highest bids made by”) we find the possible combinations of high 
bids;  the  third  and  fourth  columns  (“Number  of  winners”)  report  the  decisions  of 
auctioneers for each combination of high bids. For example: the first line includes data 
from  all  tournaments  where  two  in-group  players  submitted  the  highest  bids.  This 
happened 27 times in the experiment (last column), and in 23 cases (third column) the 
auctioneer awarded the prize to an in-group player (in other words, she maximized her 
profits 85% of the time). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
It is instructive to compare the top two lines with the bottom two lines of Table 2. 
These include data about the tournaments in which the high bids were submitted either 
all by in-group or all by out-group players. Notice that in-group bids were unmatched 
by out-group bids 81 times, whereas the opposite situation occurred only 39 times. In 
either circumstance, the auctioneer chose in the overwhelming majority of cases to give 
the prize to one of the high bids. Only nine times (11.1%) a lower out-group bid was 
preferred to a higher in-group bid; the opposite happened four times (10.2%). Notice 
that  while  choosing  a  lower  in-group  bid  may  be  considered  a  case  of  costly 
discrimination,  choosing  a  lower  out-group  bid  is  a  case  of  “reverse”  costly 
discrimination.  Given  the  low  frequency  and  symmetry  of  these  anomalous  data, 
however, they should be considered random variations in an otherwise systematically 
rational pattern of auctioneer behaviour. 
Lines 3 to 6 in Table 2 (shaded) include data about tournaments where high bids 
were submitted by in-group and out-group players at the same time. We shall refer to 
these cases as tie-breaks. Tie-breaks are an important element of our experiment, for 
they provide auctioneers with an opportunity to engage in costless discrimination. In 
tie-breaks  auctioneers may send a discriminatory  signal while still maximizing their 
profit.  This  is  not  an  unrealistic  event,  given  that  in  many  real  circumstances  an 
                                                 
4 “High bid” from now on means the highest submitted bid in a given round. Since the bidders are 
symmetric (they have the same endowment), there must be at least one and there cannot be more than 
four high bids per tournament.   17 
employer is likely to face several equally qualified applicants. Notice that in such a case 
it  would  be  inappropriate  to  speak  of  a  preference  for  discrimination,  because 
auctioneers would not be willing to pay a monetary cost to engage in favouritism. To 
distinguish, we shall speak of a discriminatory bias in tie-breaks, and leave open the 
question whether the bias is rooted in a cognitive heuristic (in-group bids might be more 
salient,  for  example)  or  reflects  an  asymmetry  in  auctioneers’  motives  (a  desire  to 
benefit in-group players). 
In tie-breaks there was an obvious asymmetry in the choices of auctioneers, with 
65%  of  the  prizes  going  to  in-group  members.  The  null  hypothesis  that  such  a 
distribution of outcomes derives from a binomial distribution that mimics an unbiased 
auctioneer can safely be rejected (P > |z| <.0001). The number of high bids submitted by 
each  type  of  player  does  not  affect  the  result  significantly:  when  auctioneers  were 
choosing  between  an  equal  number  of  in-group  and  out-group  high  bids,  in-group 
players won the tournament 66% of the time. When two high bids out of three were 
submitted by in-group members, their probability of winning was 68%. When two out 
of three high bids were submitted by out-group players, in-group players won 52% of 
the tournaments 
 
RESULT 4: Auctioneers favour in-group members when discrimination is costless (in 
tie-breaks). 
 
Given this result, it is natural to ask whether tie-break discrimination was the 
main determinant of the decline of out-group contributions. Consider that in- and out-
group bids began to diverge already in round two, and were more or less stable by round 
five.  In  the  first  round  in-group  bidders  won  almost  60%  of  the  tournaments,  even 
though they submitted on average lower bids. Consider however that aggregate data 
were  not  available  to  individual  bidders  during  the  game.  Each  player  could  only 
observe  the  distribution  of  bids  and  the  outcome  of  the  auctions  in  which  she  was 
directly involved. The relevant question then is how this feedback was processed, and 
how it influenced bidders’ strategies as they collected more evidence of discrimination.  
At the beginning of the game bidders did not know whether auctioneers were 
going to favour in-group members and discriminate against out-group players. They 
could make conjectures, of course, but given that out-group bidders did not bid less than 
in-group players in the first round it is reasonable to assume that bidders entered the   18 
game with a prior probability estimate of 0.5, which is equivalent to assuming that there 
was  no  initial  expectation  of  discrimination,  or  perhaps  with  a  mild  expectation  of 
discrimination against out-group players, which did not deter their bids significantly. 
Starting  from  the  first  round,  bidders  received  signals  regarding  auctioneers’ 
discriminatory  tastes.  Learning  can  be  represented  as  an  updating  process  of  each 
individual’s (estimated) likelihood that the prize will be assigned to a bid submitted by a 
member  of  her  group,  given  the  meaningful  signals  that  she  received  as  the  game 
proceeded.  
A signal is meaningful if it provides useful information regarding auctioneers’ 
propensity to discriminate. If all high bids have been submitted by in-group bidders, for 
example, and the auctioneer assigns the prize to a high bid, the signal is not meaningful 
according to our definition, since the choices of a biased and of an unbiased auctioneer 
would coincide. If there is a tie, in contrast, and the auctioneer chooses an in-group 
bidder, the signal may be interpreted as evidence of discrimination. Similarly, we define 
the signal as meaningful if the auctioneer awards the prize to a colour that did not make 
the highest bid, i.e. in case of costly discrimination.  In the next section we explain 
bidders’  behaviour  using  a  Bayesian  updating  model  that  exploits  the  objective 
informative content of each signal. 
 
3.2.1 A Bayesian model of learning 
We model the situation that bidders face as a sampling problem from an urn with an 
unknown  proportion  of  “in”  and  “out”  balls,  with  replacing  at  every  round.  If  the 
fraction  of  “in”  and  “out”  balls  is  not  the  same,  the  urn  represents  auctioneers’ 
stochastic  propensity  to  discriminate.  Bidders  try  to  learn  the  true  value  of  that 
propensity observing a sequence of draws from the urn (auctioneers’ decisions). At each 
round a bidder observes one ball (decision) and updates her probability estimate of the 
in/out ratio of balls in the urn. 
Bidders’  beliefs  about  the  composition  of  the  urn  can  conveniently  be 
represented  using  a  Beta  distribution,  the  shape  of  which  is  characterized  by  two 
parameters (a, b) that in our case represent the number of positive and negative signals 
received by a player in during the game. At the beginning of the game, when no signal 
has  been  observed  yet,  we  can  interpret  the  parameters  of  the  Beta  distribution  as 
already  incorporating  a  number  of  hypothetical  signals  equal  to  a-1  and  b-1, 
respectively.  For  instance,  prior  expectations  that  take  the  form  of  a  Beta(1,1)  are   19 
equivalent  to  assuming  an  entirely  open-minded  bidder  who  assigns  a  uniform 
probability over the whole [0, 1] spectrum, as if no hypothetical signal has been already 
incorporated. The uniform distribution is in fact a special case of the Beta distribution, 
when both parameters are equal to one (see Figure 3a). 
There are of course other possibilities, but as long as the symmetry is preserved 
(a = b) higher values correspond to steeper bell-shaped distributions with a mean of 0.5, 
i.e.  they  correspond  to  the  beliefs  of  a  bidder  who  expects  to  meet  an  unbiased 
auctioneer. For instance, a Beta(2,2) is represented in Figure 3b. It corresponds to the 
beliefs of a bidder who expects to face a fair auctioneer, as if she had already observed 
one positive and one negative signals. Intuitively, the higher the prior value of the two 
parameters, the stronger her initial confidence that she is facing a fair auctioneer, and 
the slower the convergence of her beliefs towards the true composition of the urn, as 
new evidence accumulates. The convergence properties of both the Beta(1,1) and the  
Beta(2,2) are depicted in Figure 3c, assuming a sequence of consistent positive signals. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The values of a and b do not need to coincide. Different values represent the 
beliefs of a bidder who expects to face a biased auctioneer. The higher b is relative to a, 
the more skewed to the right the distribution is, and the higher the expectation of being 
discriminated against. We initially assume that both in-group and out-group bidders are 
characterized  by  a  Beta(1,  1),  i.e.  that  both  populations  are  characterized  by  prior 
expectations of facing an unbiased auctioneer. This assumption is consistent with the 
data of the first period, but robustness checks will be performed to take into account 
alternative specifications. 
In  subsequent  rounds,  beliefs  are  updated  in  a  Bayesian  manner,  given  the 
signals  that  are  actually  observed.  The  characteristics  of  a  Beta  combined  with  a 
binomial distribution imply that posterior beliefs are also distributed as a Beta with the 
parameter  a  (b)  increasing  one  unit  at  a  time  as  each  positive  (negative)  signal  is 
observed. As explained earlier, we assume that the updating process is triggered only by 
meaningful signals, i.e. either by choices that imply costly discrimination or by tie-
break decisions.   20 
The next step is to estimate the reaction function of each type of player (in-
group and out-group), defined as the relation between the likelihood that one’s colour is 
going to win and the submitted bid. The goal is to account for players’ behaviour given 
their expectations throughout the whole game, but especially in the early rounds of the 
experiment where the most drastic adjustment in bidders’ behaviour takes place. We 
estimate the reaction function using the following empirical specification: 




i,t*OUT + εi,t  , 
where Bi,t is the bid submitted by player i at time t, L is the likelihood that the prize will 
be assigned to  a bidder of one’s own type, and the gs are parameters. The dummy 
variable OUT is introduced to account for the possibility that the reaction functions of 
in- and out-group players differ, or in other words that bidders from different groups 
react differently to the same signals. This is necessary to account for the possible effect 
of  the  group  identity  manipulation  we  introduced  in  phase  one  of  the  experiment. 
Moreover, the model accounts for possible non-linearities. Given the nature of dynamic 
panel of the data, in which the bid in every period depends on the whole history of what 
happened  before,  an  OLS  estimate  would  return  biased  and  inconsistent  estimates. 
Hence, we  estimate it using GMM-type instruments for the difference  equation and 
computing the standard errors with the Arellano-Bond robust VCE estimators. 
  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Results are presented in the first column of Table 3 and show that the hypothesis 
of different reaction functions is not supported by the data. In fact, the interaction terms 
are  not  significant.  This  suggests  that  the  unequal  achievements  observed  in  our 
experiment are driven by auctioneers’ decisions, rather than by prior expectations of 
discrimination, or by a difference in the reaction functions of in-group and out-group 
players. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
The  shape  of  the  reaction  function  implied  by  the  estimated  coefficients  is 
represented in Figure 4. The vertical line marks the 50% likelihood (the belief that the 
auctioneer is unbiased). A second interesting feature of the estimated reaction function   21 
is  that  both  in-group  and  out-group  players  reacted  asymmetrically  to  positive  and 
negative information: if they believed that the auctioneer was discriminating against 
them, they reduced their bids more than they  were willing to increase them if they 
believed that she was biased in their favour. 
From a theoretical point of view, the bid of a risk-neutral bidder who expects the 
opponents to bid the whole endowment jumps from 60 to 0 around a probability equal 
to .40, as we have seen. However, no such discontinuity can be detected in our data. If 
we estimate a specification including a cubic term, to allow the model to fit a possible 
inflection  point  around  the  .40  likelihood,  all  coefficients  lose  significance.  As  a 
robustness check, we also test models with different prior beliefs. Our results do not 
change qualitatively if we assume that out-group bidders have mild prior expectations 
of  being  discriminated  against  (about  1/3  probability,  summarized  by  a  Beta(1,2)), 
while in-group players believe that the auctioneer is unbiased. Coefficients are reported 
in the second column of Table 3. More generally, the specification and the results are 
robust to small perturbations of prior beliefs that go in the right direction (i.e. in-group 
players are more likely to win), provided the priors are flexible enough to quickly adapt 
to  the  evidence  that  accumulates  in  each  period.
5 An  alternative  specification  with 
stickier prior beliefs, for instance as reflected by a Beta(2,2), would be unable to fit the 
data. 
 
RESULT 5: Assuming Bayesian updating of flexible priors, all players (in-group and 
out-group) react in the same way to signals, but are more sensitive to negative than to 
positive signals. 
 
This suggests that the group identity manipulation did not have an effect on the 
way in which bidders “read” or reacted to the signals sent by auctioneers. The main 
difference – which explains the decay of their bids – is that out-group players received a 
greater amount of negative signals early in the game, compared to their in-group fellows. 
This created negative expectations of discrimination, which led to a reduction in out-
group bids. In equilibrium, auctioneers engaged in costless discrimination, out-group 
                                                 
5 Of course, this does not hold if beliefs are widely mistaken. For instance, assuming prior beliefs that 
out-group players are more likely to win would lead to significantly different reaction functions across 
groups.   22 
players bade less, and as a consequence achieved less in spite of perfectly symmetric 




Discrimination  is  a  familiar  and  yet  elusive  phenomenon.  Models  that  postulate 
preferences for discrimination are vulnerable to a simple objection: such preferences 
create arbitrage opportunities that should be exploited by non-discriminating firms in a 
competitive market. Models that postulate incorrect prior beliefs face the problem of 
justifying  the  origins  of  these  beliefs,  and  must  explain  why  workers  cannot  send 
signals that correct employers’ prior estimates. Such signaling has been observed in 
laboratory experiments, where statistical discrimination has turned out to be fragile to 
repetition. 
In this paper we have reported data from an experiment with artificially created 
group identities, where discrimination emerged quickly and persisted through time. The 
basic setting is a tournament (all-pay auction) where four bidders submit offers to an 
auctioneer, who has an incentive to assign a monetary prize to the highest bid. Bidders 
are  completely  symmetric,  and  in  equilibrium  should  submit  identical  bids  if  the 
auctioneer is unbiased. Using a classic device from social psychology, we induced a 
slight bias in auctioneers’ decisions. This bias turned out to be strong enough to deter 
high  bids  from  out-group  players,  but  not  enough  to  create  a  costly  preference  for 
discrimination.  The  discrimination  pattern  that  we  observed,  therefore,  cannot  be 
eliminated by market competition in the long run. 
Further  analysis  reveals  that  discrimination  is  mainly  driven  by  auctioneers’ 
behaviour. There is no evidence that out-group subjects had pessimistic expectations of 
discrimination at the beginning of the experiment. Nevertheless, large and significant 
differences between the bids (and outcomes) of the two groups emerged quickly with 
repetition. This is the effect of two mechanisms: on the one hand, bidders received 
signals that indicated a mild discriminatory bias in auctioneers’ decisions, and updated 
their expectations accordingly. On the other, bidders strongly reacted to negative signals, 
and drastically revised their bids downwards. Discrimination, thus, was sustained by 
players’ different reactions to positive/negative signals, combined with the fact that out-
group players received more negative signals, rather than by an anomalous reaction of 
the out-group bidders.   23 
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Figure 2: Proportion of winners per type of bidder, in each round.  27 





Figure 3: Two examples of prior belief distributions over auctioneers’ decisions in tie-breaks 
(3a): uniform distribution with a a a a = b b b b = 1, (3b): bell-shaped with a a a a = b b b b = 2. The convergence 
properties of these distributions are represented in 3c: convergence is quicker with the 

















Figure 4: Bidders’ reaction function, assuming a Beta(1,1) prior and posteriors 
that  follow  the  stream  of  positive  and  negative  meaningful  signals.  Winning 
likelihoods  (expectations)  are  on  the  horizontal  axis,  the  level  of  bids  on  the 
vertical axis. Dashed line for values of probability never observed in the sample.   29 
 
      IN      OUT    
Round  0  0<bid<60  60  0  0<bid<60  60 
1  0.05  0.70  0.25  0.02  0.59  0.39 
2  0.09  0.46  0.45  0.16  0.44  0.41 
3  0.10  0.30  0.60  0.20  0.34  0.46 
4  0.12  0.33  0.55  0.20  0.42  0.38 
5  0.14  0.27  0.59  0.32  0.34  0.34 
6  0.11  0.14  0.75  0.34  0.20  0.46 
7  0.18  0.18  0.64  0.28  0.27  0.45 
8  0.14  0.15  0.71  0.32  0.22  0.46 
9  0.25  0.18  0.57  0.34  0.18  0.48 
10  0.13  0.23  0.64  0.36  0.18  0.46 
Table 1: Polarization of bids in the course of the experiment 
 
 
Highest bids made by  Number of winners   
IN  OUT  IN  OUT  Total 
2  0  23  4  27 
1  0  49*  5*  54 
2  1  35  16*  51 
2  2  15  4  19 
1  1  41*  24*  65 
1  2  13*  12  25 
0  1  2*  27*  29 
0  2  2  8  10 
    64.3%  35.7%  280 
 




 Dependent variable: Bid(t)  (1)   unbiased prior  (2)   biased prior 
            Bid(t-1)  .0175 (0.3)  .0288 (0.5) 
            Likelihood  .8728 (2.5)**  .8160 (2.3) ** 
            Likelihood^2  -.0062 (1.9)*  -.0058 (1.8) * 
            Likelihood*out  -.3367 (1.5)  -.3219 (1.1) 
            Likelihood^2*out  .0037 (1.0)  .0049 (0.9) 
            Fixed effects  yes  yes 
                                             N  896  896 
 Test H0=zero autocorrelation (Prob >|z|)   order 1: 0.0000***    order 1: 0.0000***  
                      order 2: 0.6795   order 2: 0.6091 
Notes: Absolute value t in parenthesis. * significant 10%; ** significant 5% 
 
Table 3: Players’ reaction function.   30 
Appendix: Experimental instructions 
 
You are about to take part in an experiment funded by several foundations for research purposes. 
During the experiment you will have the opportunity to make choices that will affect your earnings. 
The exact amount of your earnings will depend on your behavior and on the behaviour of other 
participants. All the money you earn will be paid when the experiment is finished. The experiment 
is divided in two stages. At the beginning of each stage you will receive instructions that will 





In the first stage you will have to perform a collective task. At the beginning of the experiment each 
subject has been assigned a colored bracelet. Subjects with the red bracelet belong to the Red group, 
while those with blue bracelet belong to the Blue group. 
 
In the first stage of the experiment each group will have the opportunity to earn 30 euro by solving 
a simple problem. If the group is successful the amount earned will be distributed among all group 
members equally, otherwise nobody will gain anything. 
 
To earn the prize, the group must be able to memorize at least 10 verses of a poem and to write 
them correctly on a sheet of paper that will be provided by the experimenters. You can keep the text 
of the poem for five minutes, during which you will try to memorize a sufficient number of verses. 
At the end of this period, the assistant will collect the text of the poem, and will give you a blank 
sheet of paper and a pen that you can keep for another five minutes, during which you will write the 
memorized verses. At the end of this period the assistant will collect the paper and check the 
correspondence with the text of the poem. 
 
Note that: 
• You can report on paper more than ten lines (to maximize the probability of success). 
• Only verses that are reported correctly will count (for example verses with a wrong word are not 
valid, while minor misspelling do not count). 
• If less than ten verses are correct the gain of the group is zero. 
• Iif the correct verses are eleven or more, the gain of the group is still 30 euro. 
 
The amount earned by the group will be divided among all members in equal shares and paid at the 
end of the experiment, along with the money earned in the other phases of the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions?   31 
STAGE 2 
 
From this moment the second stage of the experiment begins. The instructions we have distributed 
are only for your personal use. Unlike in the first stage, it is forbidden to communicate with other 
participants. If you have any doubts or questions, please ask the assistants. If you do not stick to this 
rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from additional money rewards. 
 
During the second stage of the experiment you will have the opportunity to make choices that will 
affect your earnings. The exact amount of your earnings will depend on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants. The choices made by each subject, however, will be completely 
anonymous. The anonymity will be maintained both during and after the experiment: all the money 
you earn will be paid privately at the end of the experiment. 
 
Description of the task 
 
We introduce now the situation you will face at this stage. Twenty subjects will participate in each 
experimental session. During the experiment each subject will play with other subjects randomly 
selected among the participants, and identified only by a role (auctioneer or competitor) and a color 
(Red or Blue, depending on the bracelet that you wear) that represents the group affiliation of each 
experimental subject. 
 
Each subject will participate in a series of ten sealed bid auctions. Four competitors (two Red and 
two Blue) and an auctioneer (Red or Blue) participate in every auction. In each of the ten rounds the 
players will be grouped randomly, so each time you will play with potentially different opponents. 
The latter will be identified only by their role and their color, while their personal identity will 
remain strictly confidential. The role of each player and her colour will remain fixed throughout this 
stage of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of each auction each competitor will have a budget of 60 cents to invest to win a 
prize worth 400 cents. The auctioneer will decide to assign the prize to one of the bidders. 
In order to win the prize, each of the four bidders may offer a sum of money that does not exceed 
her budget (up to 60 cents). Bids will be made by typing a number from 0 to 60 in a screen like the 
one found on the next page. 
 
Bids will be made “in a sealed envelope”, i.e. simultaneously, without communicating with other 
players, and without the ability to operate subsequent corrections. Bids will not be reimbursed: the 
amount of money offered will be subtracted from the budget of any bidder regardless of whether 
she has won the auction or not. In other words: 
 
• Gain of the winner = 60 – bid + 400  
• Gain of the other bidders  = 60 – offer + 0 
   32 
 
 
The auctioneer may award the prize to any bidder. Each bidder will be identified on her screen only 
by a number and by the colour of her group (Red / Blue). (Note: Because the identity of competitors 
changes at every round, the subject identified as Player 1 in the first round will very likely not be 
the same person identified by the number 1 in the other rounds.) 
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The auctioneer will earn a sum of money equal to the offer of the bidder who was awarded the prize 
(i.e. the winning bid) multiplied by three. In other words: 
 
• Gain of the auctioneer = (winning bid × 3) 
 
As mentioned, each subject will participate in ten subsequent auctions. At each round players will 
be grouped randomly, so that every subject might play with potentially different opponents in 
different rounds. At the end of each auction the colour of the winner will be communicated. Each 
participant will also be notified the amount of money earned in that auction. 
 
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to fill a short questionnaire. Then the experimenters 
will pay privately the money that you have earned during the experiment. You will be asked to sign 
a receipt, and then to leave the room quietly. We would be grateful if you will not discuss the 
experiment with other students after leaving the laboratory. 
 